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TAX PLANNING IN BUSINESS PURCHASE
AGREEMENTS, WITH SAMPLE CLAUSES
BY KENT D. KEHR* AND GENE M. ZAFFTt
The success or failure of the small- or medium-sized business is de-
pendent primarily upon the ability of its "key-men," who are generally
the owners of the business. The death or retirement of one of these
men, therefore, if not provided for, can cause havoc with the business
to the detriment of the remaining shareholders or partners. This
article will consider the tax problems raised by the death of a stock-
holder and the death or retirement of a partner and the most practical
and beneficial methods of anticipating and meeting those problems.
CORPORATION
What happens when a stockholder in a closely held corporation dies?
It is obvious that some adjustment of the prior working relationship
must be made. The surviving stockholders must either work with a
new stockholder (Viz., the decedent's heir or heirs, or a purchaser of
the deceased stockholder's interest), buy out the deceased's interest,
or liquidate the business.
The alternatives which the surviving parties will have to face are
fraught with problems, not the least of which is the uncertainty in-
volved. The surviving stockholders will worry about harmonious re-
lationships with new stockholders. Will new stockholders be a source
of annoyance, and impede business management? Will there be a
fiduciary stockholder, whose status would restrict business decisions?
The heirs will worry about whether they will be able to get suffi-
cient funds out of the business. If they keep the stock, will there be
sufficient dividends; will they be forced to rely on dividends or will
they be paid a salary, too? If they sell the stock, will there be a ready
market for the stock or must they sell at forced prices?
The. solution which many businessmen have found for these prob-
lems is a contract providing that the survivors in the business will buy
out the interest of the decedent. Such contracts are usually called
"buy-and-sell agreements." These contracts assure surviving stock-
holders that they will be able to continue business policies unhindered
by outside interference. They assure a decedent's heirs of an "arm's
length" sale price.
* Member of the 1iissouri Bar; associated with Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen &
Chubb. Mr. Kehr prepared the portion of this article relating to corporations.
t Member of the Missouri Bar; member of Burnett, Stern & Liberman. Mr.
Zafft prepared the portion of this article relating to partnerships.
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Buy-and-sell agreements may take a variety of forms, but there are
two basic types: One is a "stockholder cross-purchase agreement"; the
other is a "corporate stock redemption agreement." Under a contract
of the former type, the several stockholders agree that the stock of
the first to die will be purchased by the survivors; under the latter
type, the corporation agrees to redeem the stock of a deceased stock-
holder. The corporate stock redemption agreement seems to be fa-
vored in actual use over the cross-purchase agreement for two main
reasons. In the first place, the cross-purchase agreement is cumber-
some, especially if there are more than two stockholders.1 Secondly,
it may be more advantageous taxwise to use the corporate redemption
agreement.
The funding of an agreement is as important to the objectives of
the parties as the agreement itself. It is of no benefit to any of the
stockholders to have an agreement unless they can be sure that ready
cash will be available to carry it out. Insurance is the most common
and probably the most feasible way of funding a buy-and-sell agree-
ment; at the same time, it is the use of insurance which produces
many of the income tax problems.
The Tax Advantages of the Corporate
Stock Redemption Type Agreement
The primary tax advantage to be gained by the use of a corporate
redemption type of agreement is that insurance to fund the agree-
ment can usually be purchased by a corporation at a cheaper tax cost.
Such premiums are paid with income that has only been taxed at the
corporate level, while if the stockholders pay the premiums they prob-
ably would have to do so with dollars that have been taxed both to the
corporation (as corporation income) and to the stockholders (as
dividend income). Of course, if a corporation distributes money to the
stockholders only in the form of salaries there is no double tax, but
there is a limit to the amount a corporation can distribute as salaries.
Also, there is the possibility that the corporation tax rate is lower than
the stockholders' rates.
Another tax advantage which might occur under a corporate re-
(emption agreement, whether funded with insurance or not, is that
the corporation may be permitted to accumulate earnings without
incurring the accumulated earnings tax. This would be so if such
runding were considered to be a reasonable business use of corporate
earnings. However, the possibility that the funding of a buy-and-sell
agreement may constitute an unreasonable use of earnings which
1. See text supported by note 13 infra, in connection with the problem of fund-
ing cross-purchase agreements.
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would be subject to the accumulated earnings tax is the primary disad-
vantage in using this type of agreement. The problem of the accumu-
lated earnings tax is discussed below.
Tax Treatment of Premium Payments by Corporation
A. DEDUCTIBILITY OF PREMIUM PAYMENTS BY CORPORATION. How
are insurance premiums paid by a corporation to fund the agreement
treated for tax purposes? In the first place, it is specifically provided
in the Internal Revenue Code that such payments are not deductible
by the corporation when the corporation is directly or indirectly a
beneficiary under such policy.2 Of course, if such payments were con-
sidered to be salary, they would be deductible as such.
B. POSSIBILITY OF DIVIDEND TREATMENT TO STOCKHOLDERS. The tax
effect upon the stockholders of premium payments by the corporation,
until recently at least, has not been so clearly defined. Two recent
cases, Prunier v. Commissioner3 and Sanders v. Fox,. raised the possi-
bility that such payments might be considered to be taxable to the
stockholders as dividends. Though both cases have finally been re-
versed in favor of the taxpayers, the expensive lessons learned by these
taxpayers should be observed in the future. Before discussing these
cases, however, we should consider the state of the law prior to these
two cases.
On the one hand, if the corporation paid premiums on insurance
owned by the stockholders, and the stockholders had the right to name
the beneficiaries, the premiums would constitute a distribution of a
dividend or salary to the stockholders. This is merely an application
of the principle that "the discharge by a third person of an obligation
to him is equivalent to receipt by the person." On the other hand, if
the corporation owned the insurance on which it paid premiums and
was the beneficiary, the payment of premiums would not constitute a
distribution to the stockholders, because there would be no "receipt"
by the stockholders-actual or constructive.
The Tax Court, in Paul J. Bonwito thought that these two principles
were readily apparent and so held on issues involving both types of
factual situations. In another case, Lewis v. O'Malley,7 the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit thought the corporation had retained
enough of the rights of ownership, even though the stockholder was
irrevocably granted the power to designate the beneficiaries, under the
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 264.
3. 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1958), reversing 28 T.C. 19 (1957).
4. 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958), reversing 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957).
5. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). See also
Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138 (1954).
6. 33 B.T.A. 507 (1935), aff'd, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1937).
7. 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944), reversing 49 F. Supp. 173 (D. Neb. 1943).
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policy in question that the premiums were not dividends to the insured
stockholder. In neither of these cases, however, was a buy-and-sell
agreement involved. Both the Prunier and Sanders cases involved
life insurance to fund buy-and-sell agreements, and the element that
seemed to cause difficulty was that the facts (according to the triAl
opinions) did not fit exactly into either one of the two types of polar
situations discussed above.
The trial courts in both cases held that the premium payments
constituted a dividend to the stockholders, because the stockholders
derived more benefit from the insurance than the corporation. What
was meant by benefit, however, was not clearly defined. Also, the
courts seemed to be confused in both cases as to who actually owned
the policies. In the Prunier case, for example, the policies were issued
to the stockholders, and the only evidence of corporate ownership
during the year in question was an agreement between the parties
that the proceeds were to go to the corporation to be used by it to buy
out the interest of the first to die. The courts of appeal, in reversing
these two cases, first determined that the corporations did own the
policies and, therefore ruled, that the stockholders could not be said to
be in receipt of income.
The courts of appeal did allude to the question of whether the
corporation benefited from the purchase of the insurance or, in other
words, whether there was some corporate purpose in connection with
the purchase of the insurance. It is not clear why the courts saw fit
to mention this aspect. It would not be pertinent to the principles
discussed above. It might be pertinent, however, in determining
whether premium payments constitute dividends, if the "sham trans-
action" doctrine could be applied in this situation. The sham transac-
tion doctrine refers to the fact that transactions which have no sub-
stantive effect, but are merely legal devices to avoid taxation, will be
disregarded. This rule has been applied to many types of situations,'
but it has never been used in determining whether the payment of
insurance premiums by a corporation on the lives of its stockholders
constitute dividends to the stockholders.
The trial court in the case of Casale v. Commissioner attempted to
use the sham transaction doctrine to tax premium payments as divi-
dends where the corporation had purchased insurance on the life of
the sole stockholder to fund a non-qualified pension agreement. It was
admitted that the corporation owned the policy and had all the rights
appertaining thereto. The Tax Court thought that because the insured
8. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Kocin v. United States, 187
F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1951).
9. 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
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owned all the stock in the corporation and therefore had complete con-
trol and dominion of the corporation, the stockholder was in reality
only purchasing an annuity policy for himself. On this basis, the court
concluded that the transaction "lacked bona fides and was merely a
device whereby petitioner attempted to avail himself of corporation
funds without incurring a tax on their use." 10
The trial court's decision in Casale was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court held that the arrangement
did not lack substance and, in doing so went back, in effect, to the
principles upon which Prunier and Sanders were later decided. The
court pointed out that since the corporation did own the policy and
could do with it as it saw fit, no economic benefit really vested in the
stockholder. Nothing would be received by the stockholder until he
started receiving payments pursuant to his pension agreement. Until
the proceeds were thus paid out, the insurance would be subject to
the claims of the corporation's creditors. It was also pointed out that
the corporation was actively engaged in manufacturing and hence was
not itself just a sham or shell corporation.
Suppose that the purpose of the insurance on which the corpora-io-h
pays premiums is to fund a cross-purchase type buy-and-sell agree-
ment, would the principle of Prunier and Sanders still apply in de-
termining whether the stockholders were taxable on the premiums?
The controlling principle should be the same. If the corporation owns
the policy and has all the rights thereunder, the stockholders cannot
be said to be in receipt of any benefit by the payment of the premium.
The answer should be the same if some one other than the corporation
is the named beneficiary, as long as the corporation has the right to
change the beneficiary. The proper time to tax the stockholders is
when an amount is paid out to the stockholders pursuant to the cross-
purchase agreement, in which case the surviving stockholders would
be in receipt of income to the extent that the proceeds-are used to pay
for their obligation to purchase the deceased's shares.
In Doran v. Commissioner," the corporation paid for insurance
on the lives of stockholders in order to fund a cross-purchase type
buy-and-sell agreement. The policies were held by a trustee and upon
the death of one of the stockholders the proceeds were paid to the
trustee and used by him to carry out the purchase agreement. The
commissioner tried to tax the proceeds to the surviving stockholders
as dividends, because the proceeds were used to fulfill their personal
obligations. The court of appeals held that the policies were not owned
by the corporation, i.e., that the trustees were holding the insurance
10. 26 T.C. at 1027.
11. 246 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957),, reversing 15 CCH Tax Ct. blem. 629, P-H
1956 T.C.Miem. Dec. 7 56121 (1956).
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for the stockholders and not for the corporation, and hence that there
was no distribution from the corporation which could be taxed. The
implication from this, although nothing was said in the opinion, is
that each premium should have been taxed to the stockholder.
In Paramount-Richards Theaters, Inc. v. Comissioner,'2 the corpora-
tion apparently retained no interest in the policy and the premiums
paid by the corporation were held to be dividends to the two sole stock-
holders. Since the payment of proceeds to the deceased stockholder's
heirs was to reduce the cost of the stock to the survivor by one-half
the amount of the proceeds, both stockholders were going to benefit
equally by the insurance proceeds and both were taxed equally upon
the payment of the premiums.
On the basis of the above cases, it appears that the primary prin-
ciple to be used in determining whether premium payments will be
taxed as dividends is "ownership." If the corporation owns the poli-
cies, and has all the rights thereunder, the premiums will not be divi-
dends. On the other hand, if the stockholders own the policies, pre-
mium payments will constitute dividends. There could conceivably
be a situation where the corporation owned the policies, but where the
arrangement lacked substance, and the premiums would hence be tax-
able to the stockholders. In view of these principles the following
points should be observed in purchasing insurance to fund a corpora-
tion redemption type buy-and-sell agreement:
(1) The stockholders or their estates should not have any in-
terest or right in the policy or proceeds under the terms of the
policy itself or under any agreement-
(2) The proceeds should be available for corporate purposes.
(Perhaps it should be recited that the insurance is subject to the
rights of corporate creditors.)
(3) The price of the stock should be determined independently
of the amount of insurance proceeds, and the amount of insurance
proceeds should not be a minimum price which the deceased's
estate will receive in all events.
(4) Corporate objectives should be stressed in the minutes and
in all agreements.
Do Insurance Proceeds Constitute Dividends to Stockholders?
Generally speaking, insurance iroceeds, as such, will not be taxable
under either the cross-purchase or corporate redemption type of agree-
ment. The Code provides that "gross income does not include amounts
received . . . under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are
paid by reason of the death of the insured."'Is There is one important
12. 153 F2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946), affirming 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 806, P-H
1944 T.C. Mer. Dec. 44274 (1944).
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101 (a) (1).
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exception, however.'4 This exception provides that the proceeds from
a policy which was purchased for a valuable consideration will be tax-
able to the extent of the gain unless the policy is purchased by the in-
sured, a partner of the insured, or a corporation in which the insured
is a stockholder. Since the gain from an insurance policy purchased
by one stockholder from the estate of another stockholder is recog-
nized, it can readily be seen that the "transferee for value" rule might
apply to a cross-purchase type of agreement where each stockholder
has a policy on the life of the other stockholders. For example, when
stockholder C dies, stockholders A and B collect the insurance proceeds
on policies which they hold on C's life, tax-free, and use this to buy C's
interest in the corporation. But then, C's estate has insurance policies
on the lives of A and B, in whose lives the estate has no insurable
interest. If, upon the death of stockholder C, survivor A buys from C's
estate the policy on the life of survivor B, and survivor B buys from
C's estate the policy on the life of survivor A, the proceeds of both
policies will constitute income to the extent that they exceed the costs
of the policies.
It would, of course, be possible for surviving stockholders A and B
to purchase the policies on their own lives, and receive the proceeds
tax-free. Presumably, however, the buy-and-sell agreement would
then be under-funded.
Will Redemption of the Deceased Stockholder's Stock
Constitute a Dividend?
In considering whether the redemption of the stock of the deceased
stockholder will constitute a dividend, there are two possibilities: In
the first place, will it constitute a dividend to the deceased's estate?
Secondly, will it constitute a dividend to the remaining stockholders?
The tax liability of the estate is determined under section 30215 just
the same as for any stockholder whose stock is being redeemed. If the
estate meets any of the three tests of that section, i.e., if the redemp-
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101 (a) (2) provides: "(2) Transfer for valuable
consideration.-In the case of a transfer for a valuable consideration, by assign-
ment or otherwise, of a life insurance contract or any interest therein, the amount
excluded from gross income by paragraph (1) shall not exceed an amount equal
to the sum of the actual value of such consideration and the premiums and other
amounts subsequently paid by the transferee. The preceding sentence shall not
apply in the case of such a transfer-
"(A) if such contract or interest therein has a basis for determining gain or
loss in the hands of a transferee determined in whole or in part by reference to
such basis of such contract or interest therein in the hands of the transferor, or
"(B) if such transfer is to the insured, to a paziner of the insured, to a
partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which the
insured is a shareholder or officer."
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302.
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tion completely terminates the estate's interest, or is substantially dis-
proportionate, or is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, the re-
demption will be treated as a sale of stock and hence taxable only at
capital gains rates. The amount of gain in such case will probably be
small, because the estate has the date of death (or optional valuation
date) value as its basis26 If the redemption does not meet one of these
tests, the amount received by the estate will be dividend income to the
extent of the corporation's earnings and profits. Ordinarily, if the
stockholders are not related and the buy-and-sell agreement provides
for a complete redemption, the transaction will qualify under section
302 and therefore the estate will not have dividend income.
Regarding the status of the surviving stockholders under a corpo-
rate redemption type buy-and-sell agreement, it is now possible to say
that redemption of stock will not constitute a dividend to them.'7 The
Tax Court opinion in Joseph R. Holsey"s frightened some observers
into thinking that redemption under a corporate redemption agree-
ment might constitute a dividend to the surviving stockholders. In
that case, one of two stockholders assigned his option to buy all the
stock of the second stockholder to the corporation. The corporation
exercised this option and the Tax Court held that the remaining stock-
holder had received a dividend of the purchase price at the time the
option was exercised by the corporation, because the redemption had
increased his interest in the corporation from fifty per cent to one
hundred per cent
The theory of the Tax Court was clearly wrong because the corpo-
ration's net worth was depleted by the purchase of stock, and stock-
holder thus owned one hundred per cent of a smaller asset after the
redemption. If the redemption price is fair market value, the value
of the remaining stockholder's interest should be exactly the same
after the redemption as it was before. Thus, before the redemption
the stockholder might have a fifty per cent interest in a corporation
worth $1,000,000 and after the redemption own one hundred per cent
of a corporation worth only $500,000; and theoretically the stock-
holder's economic position has not changed.
Suppose that the redemption price was determined by agreement
at fair value two years prior to death, but at the time of death the
16. Int. Rev. Code. of 1954, § 1014.
It is specifically provided in the regulations that payment under a buy-and-sell
agreement does not constitute income in respect of a decedent to the estate.
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2 (Example 4) (1957). The result would be the
same to the estate if it sold the stock to the remaining stockholders pursuant
to a cross-purchase agreement.
17. Holsey v. Commissioner, No. 12, 548, 3d Cir., Sept. 3, 1958, 2 Am. Fed.
Ta ( R.2d 5660, reversing 28 T.C. 962 (1957); Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
18. 28 T.C. 962 (1957), rev'd, Holsey v. Commissioner, supra note 17.
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redemption price is less than fair market value. Will the surviving
stockholder be in receipt of a dividend to the extent that the redemp-
tion price is less than fair market value because the survivor's eco-
nomic interest will be increased to that extent? According to the
Holsey case, the answer is no. The court considered it just an un-
realized appreciation in the market value of an asset. In Holsey, the
corporation redeemed fifty per cent of its stock for $80,000 at a time
when the earnings and profits of the company were over $300,000,
and the court held that the remaining stockholder had not received a
dividend because the purchase price was fair (according to the court)
at the time the option was granted.
By definition, under a corporate redemption agreement it is the
corporation's obligation, to buy the stock and not an obligation of the
surviving stockholders. Naturally, if corporate funds are used to fulfill
a surviving stockholder's obligation to buy a deceased stockholder's
stock under a cross-purchase agreement, the survivor will be in receipt
of income under the -familiar doctrine of Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner2s
Will Premium Payments Be Subject to the
Accumulated Earnings Tax?
Section 531 of the 1954 Code imposes a tax, in addition to the reg-
ular income tax, upon earnings for the year which are accumulated in
order to avoid paying a dividend. Section 533(a) provides that the
fact that earnings and profits are accumulated beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid
paying a dividend. Case law indicates that one of the ways a corpora-
tion can prove that it did not accumulate earnings to avoid paying a
dividend is to show that the funds were accumulated for the reason-
able needs of the business. In view of the pivotal status of the question
of "reasonable needs of the business" in connection with the accumu-
lated earnings tax, it is necessary to inquire whether the purchase of
insurance to fund a buy-and-sell agreement constitutes a reasonable
need of the business.
The case of Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner-0 has been relied upon by
many as authority that premium payments to fund a buy-and-sell
agreement are a reasonable need of the business and will not, there-
fore, subject the corporation to an accumulated earnings tax. Actually,
the issue in that case was whether money borrowed to pay for insur-
ance on the lives of the two primary stockholders constituted "invested
capital" for excess profits tax purposes. It could only constitute "in-
19. 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Zipp v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1958),
affirming 28 T.C. 314 (1957).
20. 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951), reversing 14 T.C. 1295 (1950).
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vested capital" if it were used for business purposes. Since the in-
surance was used, in later years at least, to fund a buy-and-sell agree-
ment, the court had occasion to comment on whether such use was a
reasonable need of the business in holding that such insurance did
constitute invested capital:
Harmony is the essential catalyst for achieving good manage-
ment; and good management is the sine qua non of long-term
business success. Petitioner, deeming its management sound and
harmonious, conceived of the trust to insure its continuation.
Petitioner apparently anticipated that, should one of its key stock-
holder-officers die, those beneficially interested in his estate might
enter into active participation in corporate affairs and possibly
introduce an element of friction. Or his estate, not being bound
by contract to sell the stock to petitioner, might sell it to adverse
interests. The fragile bark of a small business can be wrecked
on just such uncharted shoals.n
There were other cases, too, which created a general atmosphere
that led practitioners to think that insurance funding of a buy-and-
sell agreement is a reasonable business need. In Edgar M. Docherty-,2
the corporation could not afford to buy all of the stock of any one of
the majority stockholders upon his death, despite the fact that the
corporation carried insurance on their lives. However, by converting
some of the equity capital into debt, the corporation could put itself
in a position where it could buy all the stock of a deceased stockholder
and thus be assured of harmonious ownership and control. It was held
that the corporation had a business purpose in exchanging bonds for
stock and that, therefore, the exchange would be considered a tax-free
reorganization.
In Dill Mfg. Co.,2 3 and in Gazette Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,'
the courts held that expenditures to purchase minority stock interests
did not indicate that there had been an unreasonable accumulation of
funds, nor was the purchase itself an unreasonable accumulation of-
funds. It appeared in both cases that the purchase of stock was un-
planned and that funds used for the purchase had been accumulated
for other reasons but were used to purchase stock when minority
interests became disgruntled.
Although none of the cases actually involved the direct issue of
whether the purchase of insurance to fund buy-and-sell agreements
was a reasonable business use which will not subject the corporation
to the accumulated earnings tax, the opinions looked very favorable
until two recent pronouncements by the Tax Court. One of the cases
21. Id. at 233.
22. 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942).
23. 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939).
24. 103 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark. 1952).
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has been affirmed by the court of appeals. Again, neither case is ex-
actly on joint-but they are unfavorable precedents.
In the Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting Co. case 5 the commissioner
had asserted that an accumulated earnings tax was due and the tax-
payer argued that the accumulation of earnings was prompted, among
other reasons, by the fact that all of the surplus would be needed by
the corporation to buy up the stock of one of the two fifty per cent
stockholders, if the dissension which existed between the two forced a
split-up. The court thought that this was not a corporate business
purpose, but rather a stockholder motivated purpose. The Gazette and
Dill cases were distinguished on the grounds that those cases involved
the buying out of minority stockholders.
In Pelton Steel Casting Co.,21 two stockholders owning a combined
eighty per cent interest in the corporation decided that they would
selltheir stock. The third stockholder had been largely responsible for
the company's successful operating policies and believed that these
policies might be jeopardized if the controlling stock got into the
hands of some outside group. For this reason, the third stockholder
decided to buy out the other two and the two majority owners agreed
to this. The third stockholder did not have sufficient funds to buy all
the outstanding stock, -so it was arranged to have the corporation re-
deem $500,000 in stock from the two controlling stockholders and the
third stockholder buy $300,000 in stock. In order for the corporation
to have funds to redeem the stock, it did not declare a dividend for
the year of the purchase and the commissioner asserted an accumu-
lated earnings tax.
The issue, of course, was whether the redemption of stock by the
corporation was a reasonable business use of its funds. The court
held that such redemption was not a reasonable business use, and that
the corporation was subject to the tax. The court pointed out that
the retiring stockholders saved a considerable amount of taxes by
handling the transaction in this manner and that the retirement of
the stock fulfilled the personal needs of the stockholders and avoided
only "theoretical harms" of the corporation. (In fact, the court
thought that the transaction might have weakened the corporation
financially because it had to borrow money to make the purchase.)
The court recognized that there was an obvious conflict with the
opinions in the Dill and Gazette cases, but those cases were again
distinguished on the grounds that there the corporations were re-
deeming a minority interest. The significance of this distinction is not
very clear, but apparently it has something to do with whether the
transaction fulfilled a stockholder purpose or a corporate purpose.
25. 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1433, P-H 1956 T.C. Diem. Dec. 56275 (1956).
26. 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aft'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958).
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Estate Tax Treatment
Estate tax consideration should play a major role in planning a
buy-and-sell agreement, for two reasons: First, the planner will not
wish both the proceeds of the insurance and the value of the stock to
be included in the deceased's estate. Secondly, if the estate is to re-
ceive only a certain amount for the deceased's interest, the planner
will probably want to make this amount the controlling value for
estate tax purposes, so that he will not be paying an estate tax on a
larger amount and, perhaps more important, so that there will not
be protracted disputes with the government about the value of the
interest.
Regarding the first consideration, the general rule is that insuranee
is not included in an estate if the estate does not received the proceeds
and the decedent did not have any of the incidents of ownership.?
Thus, under a corporate redemption agreement, if one has been scrupu-
lous about keeping the ownership of the insurance in the hands of the
corporation in order to avoid having the premiums taxed as dividends,
the decedent stockholder would not have any of the incidents of owner-
ship and the proceeds would not be includible in his estate. Under a
cross-purchase agreement, it is customary to cross the insurance, but
this is not necessary to keep the insurance out of the estate when the
insurance is to be credited against the purchase of stock.23 " However,
whether the insurance is crossed may make a difference to the sur-
vivor. In the case of a partnership buy-and-sell agreement it has been
held that the survivor does not add the value of the proceeds to his
partnership basis when the proceeds are paid directly to the deceased's
estate.2' To make certain that, in a corporate cross-purchase plan, the
surviving stockholders may add the value of the proceeds to the basis
of their stock, it would be wise for the stockholders to cross the insur-
ance rather than to own the insurance on their own lives, and have the
survivors pay over the proceeds to the deceased's estate.
The proceeds of the insurance may indirectly slip into the decedents
estate, under a corporate redemption agreement, if the amount of
insurance increases the value of the decedents interest in the corpora-
tion. This may happen in two ways:
(1) The parties may intentionally value the stock to include
part or all of the proceeds of the insurance.
(2) The commissioner may contend that the proceeds of the
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
28. John T. H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938); Estate of Ealy, 10 CCH Tax
CL Mern. 431, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. 51137 (1951). See also Ray E. Tomp-
kins, 13 T.C. 1054 (1949); M. W. Dobrzensky, 34 B.T.A. 305 (1936); Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 30 B.T.A. 679 (1934) (all involving partnerships).
29. Paul Legallet, 41 B.T.A. 294 (1940).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
insurance must be included in the value of the stockY' Presum-
ably, the commissioner could make such a contention in any case
except where the agreement is' binding for estate tax purposes,
under the rules discussed below11
Whether the parties ought to draw the agreement to include the
proceeds in the valuation of stock can only be answered in a partisan
fashion. From the decedent stockholder's point of view, the proceeds
should be included in the valuation, because a portion of his share of
the corporation's earnings were used to purchase the insurance and
his estate is, therefore, entitled to a pro-rata share of the proceeds.
On the other hand, the surviving stockholders would not want the pro-
ceeds included in the value of the stock which the corporation must
buy. The answer to the argument that the deceased helped pay the
premiums and should therefore be entitled to share in the proceeds
is that the idea of the insurance was to pay for the stock which must
be bought and if the proceeds are included in the value of the stock,
just that much more insurance must be purchased to pay for the
stock. Such pyramiding could go on ad infinitum. On such reasoning
many stockholders are willing to accept an agreement excluding the
value of the proceeds from the value of the stock-especially since, at
the time the agreement is drawn, each party probably believes he will
be the survivor.
There is also, however, a compromise position. The cash surrender
value of all the policies, including the policy on the deceased's life,
could be included in the value of the stock as of the day prior to death.
The only reason for this is that it gives the deceased the benefit of
some of the premiums paid on his behalf, but yet gives the survivors
the benefit of the proceeds in excess of the cash surrender value.
After it has been determined how the stock is going to be valued,
the draftsman should attempt to make the valuation binding on the
government The regulations indicate the minimum requirements
which are essential if an agreement is going to have any influence
on valuation.
Securities .sbject to an option or contract to purchase. Another
person may hold an option or a contract to purchase securities
owned by a decedent at the time of his death. The effect, if any,
30. The proposed regulations provided that the proceeds must be considered
in valuing the stock unless the agreement was binding on the commissioner and
was for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. U.S.
Treas. Proposed Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (b), 21 Fed. Reg. 7886 (1956). This pro-
vision was omitted in the final regulations.
31. In two cases where the corporation did own policies and receive the pro-
ceeds on the life of a shareholder, but where there was no buy and sell agreement,
the proceeds were included as a corporate asset in valuing the stock. Newell v.
Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1933); W. A. Blair, 4 B.T.A. 954 (1926).
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that is given to the option or contract price in determining the
value of the securities for estate tax purposes depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case. Little weight will be ac-
corded a price contained in an option or contract under which the
decedent is free to dispose of the underlying securities at any price
he chooses during his lifetime. Such is the effect, for example, of
an agreement on the part of a shareholder to purchase whatever
shares of stock the decedent may own at the time of his death.
Even if the decedent is not free to dispose of the underlying se-
curities at other than the option or contract price, such price will
be disregarded in determining the value of the securities unless it
is determined under the circumstances of the particular case that
the agreement represents a bona fide business arrangement and
not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects of
his bounty for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth.32
In short, the regulations set forth two requirements for an agreed
value to be binding, namely, that the value be an arm's length or
business arrangement, and that the decedent must not be able to sell
the stock during his lifetime without restriction at other than the
contract price. There are many court decisions on the subject, but all
deal with interpretations of these two requirements. 33
Conclusio
Regarding the income tax treatment of corporate buy-and-sell
agreements, the commissioner's attack has been systematic, but in-
effectual to date. First, he contended insurance premium payments to
fund an agreement were a dividend to the shareholders, and lost.
Then, he contended that the actual redemption of stock was a dividend
to the remaining shareholders, and lost again. In view of the Pelton
Steel case, it seems likely he will next contend that the purchase of
insurance constitutes an unreasonable accumulation of earnings.
Regarding the estate tax probelms of buy-and-sell agreements,
valuation of the stock can be a trap for the unwary. The two require-
ments for making an agreement binding upon the commissioner have
never been adequately defined. Nevertheless, it seems possible, espe-
cially when the parties are unrelated, to draft an agreement which is
subject to a minimum of risk that the valuation agreed upon by the
parties will be upset.
32. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
33. See Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate & Gift Taxes 533 (1956); Ness,
Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options to Purchase Stock
on Death, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 796 (1949); Valuation of Stock Subject to Restric-
tive Agreements for Federal Estate & Gift Taxation, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 123 (1946).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
PARTNERSHIPS
This part of the article will make no attempt to encompass the
entire area of partnership agreements, but will confine itself to a
consideration of some of the tax aspects of "buy-and-sell" provisions
contained within such agreements.
Prior to the 1954 Code, the tax consequences of the buy-and-sell
provisions of a partnership agreement frequently were extremely diffi-
cult to predict. Since its adoption, however, taxpayers have gained
rather greater certainty of tax treatment, although often at their own
expense.
Sale or Retirement Prior to Death
A partnership, by its very nature, requires close personal contact
between the partners; and, although every venture is undertaken with
the expectation of cooperation and success, such is not alvays the case.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide at the time of the formation of a
partnership a procedure for the withdrawal of its members.
A logical starting point is to consider a provision that will permit a
partner to sell his interest in the partnership either to the remaining
partners or to a stranger. The tax treatment accorded such a sale is
specifically set forth in section 741.34 Thus, the problem of whether an
interest in a partnership is an entity unto itself, or is a composite of
the various assets owned by the partnership is resolved in favor of the
former. Section 741 adopts the prior case law -5 with the exception
that unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated inventory
are treated separately.
Section 751, to which section 741 specifically refers, provides, in
essence, that unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated in-
ventory will not be subject to capital gain treatment. Its purpose is to
prevent the conversion of what would normally be ordinary income
into capital gain by means of the collapsible partnership, i.e.: a cash
basis partnership sells goods or renders services on open account, and
then the partners sell their interests, which have appreciated in value
34. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 741: "In the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership', gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor
partner. Such gain or loss shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751 (relating
to unrealized receivables and inventory items which have appreciated substantially
in value)."
35. First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1950); Com-
missioner v. Smith, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1949); Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d
471 (5th Cir. 1949); Thornby v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1944);
Stilgenbaur v. United States, 115 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1940); Hamilton A. Gray,
11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 17 (1952), P-H 1952 T.C. Meem. Dec. 52002; Anna
Neuman, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 877 (1950), P-H 1950 T.C. Miem. Dec. 50240.
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because of the unrealized accounts receivable. Unrealized receivables
and substantially appreciated inventory items are referred to as "sec-
tion 751 property."3'
The gain or loss attributable to a selling partner's interest in section
751 property shall be ordinary gain or. loss.Y-. This gain or loss is
measured by the difference between (1) the portion of the total
amount realized for the partnership interest allocated to section 751
property, and (2) the portion of the selling partner's basis for his
entire interest allocated to such property. Generally, the portion of
the total amount realized which the seller and the purchaser allocate
to section 751 property in an arm's length agreement will be accepted
by the Commissioner.-' Perhaps the following example will illustrate
the operation of sections 741 and 751 to a sale of a partnership in-
terest:
Assume the balance sheet of the personal service AB partnership
(cash basis) is as follows:
ASSETS
Basis per Books Market Value
Cash $ 6,000 $ 6,000
Other Assets 10,000 12,000
Unrealized receivables (section 751 items) 0 10,000
$16,000 $28,000
LIABILITIES
Capital Account A $ 8,000 $14,000
B 8,000 14,000
$16,000 $28,000
If A sells his interest to C for the present market value, $14,000, A
will have realized $5,000 ordinary income and $1,000 capital gain.
Since the partnership had no basis for the unrealized receivables, A
has no basis for his one-half. Therefore, of the $14,000 paid, $5,000
is attributable to A's one-half of the section 751 property, which has a
zero basis; and the entire $5,000 is realized and recognized as ordinary
income. The balance of the purchase price, $9,000 is attributable to
the balance of the partnership interest which has an $8,000 basis to A.
Thus, he has $1,000 of capital gain. Even if the "other assets" were
not capital assets, the $1,000 would be capital gain, provided, natu-
rally, they were not section 751 property. Any amount realized by A
36. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a) (1) (1956).
37. Ibid.
38. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1 (a) (2) (1956).
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in excess of $13,000 ($5,000 section 751 property and $8,000 basis)
will be treated as capital gain .3 9
In addition to the gain recognized on the sale of his interest, a
selling. partner ill hive to recognize, as ordinary income, his dis-
tributable share of the partnership income to the date of sale.4 0 This
is so because for the partner selling his entire interest, the partner-
ship's taxable year closes as of the date of sale.421 Thus, poor timing
as to the date of the-sale of an interest in a partnership may result in
a "bunching" of income to the selling partner. The following hypo-
theticalsituation will illustrate the danger:
AB partnership is on a fiscal year basis ending June 30. Partner A
is on calendar year basis. For the fiscal year July 1, 1957, to June 30,
1958, A's distributive share of partnership income is $20,000. On
October 1, 1958, A sells his partnership interest to C, and as of that
date, A's distributive share of partnership income for period July 1,
1958, to September 30, 1958, is $5,000. A will have to recognize the
entire $25,000 in his personal return for the year 1958.42
Since this bunching will result only if A sells his entire interest
between July 1, 1958, and December 31, 1958, it may be advisable for
him to sell most of his interest on October 1, 1958, and sell the balance
after January 1, 1959. Section 706(c) (2) (B) specifically provides
that the partnership's taxable year shall not close with respect to a
partner who sells less than his entire interest. If this "split-sale" pro-
cedure is adopted in order to avoid a bunching of income, it is sug-
gested that more than a bare minimum interest be retained until the
following calendar year so that the commissioner will have no ground
to maintain the transaction was one of form rather than substance.
However, it is felt that the bunching problem will be negligible for
partnerships organized after 1954 because of the difficulty in placing
the partnership on a taxable year different from that of its principal
partners 3
If the bunching of income of a fiscal year partnership-calendar
year partner may be a problem, provision may be made for the pur-
chase price to be paid in two installments (one in each of two different
calendar years) with the selling partner retaining an interest until the
second installment is paid. -
39. 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 27, at 13.
40. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(a) (1) (1956). Note that if the selling partner
has a one-half or greater interest in capital and profits of the partnership, the
partnership terminates and the taxable year closes as to all partners. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 708 (b) (1) (B).
41. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 706(c) (2) (A) (i); U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1
(c) (1) (1956).
42. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 706 (a).
43. Id. -§ 706(b).
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It should be noted that the above buy-and-sell provision considers
the sale of a partnership interest to the remaining partners as in-
dividuals, or to a stranger. It specifically avoids treating the trans-
action as a sale to the partnership. Although a sale to the individual
remaining partners is desirable to the seller, it may not be so to the
remaining partners. As a practical matter, they would probably
prefer that the partnership, as an entity, purchase the seller's interest.
If the partnership is the purchaser the transaction is treated as a
"retirement" of a partner.
The case law prior to the 1954 Code raised considerable doubt con-
cerning allocation of pa.yments made by the partnership to a retiring
partner for his capital interest in the partnership and his proportion-
ate share of partnership profits. In Bull v. United States,'" it was held
that payments made to the executor of the estate of a deceased part-
ner who elected, under the partnership agreement, to participate in
the partnership profits for one year after the decedent's death re-
ceived the payments as income and not in payment for the decedents
interest in the partnership. Although never overruled, the decision
has had little or no following. Subsequent decisions held that if the
deceased or retiring partner had a material capital interest in the
partnership, payments made by the partnership after death or retire-
ment were made in purchase of the partner's interest and not as
distributions of partnership profits. 5 The Bull case was distinguished
on the ground that the deceased partner there had no capital interest.
If the partnership agreement, however, provided for an allocation of
the payments between the capital interest and future profits, the Tax
Court accepted such allocation.46
The draftsmen of the 1954 Code have made great headway in re-
moving the uncertainty in this area by the provisions of section 736.
44. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
45. McClennen v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942); Estate of
Nutter, 46 B.T.A. 35 (1942); Estate of Miller, 38 B.T.A. 487 (1938).
46. Sidney Hess, 12 T.C. 773 (1949); Charles F. Coates, 7 T.C. 125 (1946).
47. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 736:
"PAYMENTS TO A RETIRING PARTNER OR A DECEASED
PARTNER'S SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST.
(a) PAYME.NTS CONSMERED AS DxsTarBUTmrx SHARE OR GUARArEED PAY-
MET.-Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a retiring partner or a
deceased partner shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be considered-
(1) as a distributive share to the recipient of partnership income if the
amount thereof is determined with regard to the income of the partnership,
or
(2) as a guranteed payment described in section 707(c) if the amount
thereof is determined without regard to the income of the partnership.
(b) PAYMENTS FOR INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a
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The section specifically spells out how payments to retiring partners
are to be allocated between payments for interests in the partnership
and payments in the nature of income. For the sake of brevity, pay-
ments for interests in the partnership will be designated 736 (b) pay-
ments and other payments as 736(a) payments. Section 736(a)
payments are taxed to the recipient as ordinary income, while 736 (b)
payments are treated as return -of capital and capital gains. As a
corollary to the tax treatment given the retiring partner, the partner-
ship is- permitted to deduct 736(a) payments, but not 736(b) pay-
ments. Section 736 (b) (2) provides what items constitute partnership
property under section 736(b) (1). Unrealized receivables are ex-
cluded 4 s and good will is excluded unless the partnership agreement
provides for a payment with respect to good will."
The fact that a payment for good will may be a section 736 (b) or a
section 736(a) payment depending on the inclusion or exclusion of a
good will provision in the purchase agreement has created a special
situation. One of the leading authorities in the area of partnership
taxation has developed a "three tier" payment analysis of section
736.50 The first tier payment is for the retiring partner's interest in
the partnership, the second tier payment is for good will, and the third
tier payments are those in excess of the first two tiers.
The first tier payment will be treated as a section 736 (b) payment.
However, it must be noted that if the assets of the partnership include
unrealized receivables the retiring partner's interest in the unrealized
- receivables will be subject to section 736(a) treatment,51 The second
tier payment will be treated as a section 736(b) or a section 736(a)
payment depending upon the inclusion or exclusion of a "good will"
provision in the agreement. If the partnership agreement provides
for a payment for the retiring partner's interest in good will, the
retiring or a deceased partner shall, to the extent such payments (other than
payments described in paragraph (2)) are determined, under reguluations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, to be made in exchange for the
interest of such partner in partnership property, be considered as a distribu-
tion by the partnership and not as a distributive hare or guaranteed pay-
ment under subsection (a).
(2) SPECrIAL RuLs.-For purposes of this subsection, payments in ex-
change for an interest in partnership property shall not include amounts
paid for-
(A) unrealized receivables of the partnership (as defined in Section
751(c)), or
(B) good will of the partnership, except to the extent that the partner-
ship agreement provides for payment with respect to good will."
48. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 736 (b) (2) (A).
49. Id. § 736 (b) (2) (B).
50. Willis, Handbook of Partnership Taxation, §§ 26.03-.06 (1957).
51. See note 15 supra; U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b) (2) (1956).
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retiring partner will have the benefit of capital gain, but the partner-
ship will have no right to deduct the amount of the payment If, how-
ever, the agreement contains no reference to good will, or if the agree-
ment specifically states that no payment is beifig made for good will,
all amounts paid in excess of the retiring partner's interest in the
partnership will be ordinary income to him, but the partnership is
entitled to deduct such payments.52 Tier three payments are treated
as section 736 (a) payments, whether paid as a guaranteed amount or
as a percentage of future profits.5"
If a partnership is engaged in manufacturing or commerce, it is
very likely to have developed valuable and vendible good will. If,
however, the partnership is a professional one, there has been some
question as to the sale of its good will-the recent decisions holding
that there may be.5 4 After having been unsuccessful in litigating the
matter, the commissioner has recognized that vendible good will may
attach to a particular firm name, if the right to the exclusive use of
such name may be assigned. Thus, if a sale of a professional type
business includes the right to the exclusive use of the firm name, the
portion of the sales price attributable to such right shall be treated as
derived from the sale of good will.55 Therefore, if the retiring partner
permits the use of his name by the firm after his retirement, and such
firm has an established reputation, it is submitted that a section
736 (b) payment could be made for good will if specified in the agree-
ment. The valuation placed upon good will by an arm's length agree-
ment of the partners is generally regarded as correct whether specific
in amount or determined by a formula."
If the partners believe the good will of the film to have any sub-
stantial value, a problem may arise in the drafting of the agreement.
A retiring partner will, naturally, desire that the agreement specifi-
cally provide that the partnership is paying for his interest in good
will. The remaining partners will desire that no mention be made of
good will. An often overlooked provision in the Code can go a long
way towards solving the problem.'
7
52. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1 (a) (4) (1956).
53. Id. §§ 1.736-1(a) (3) (i), 1.736-1(a) (3) (ii).
54. Masquelette's Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956);
Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 3251 (1950); Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
55. 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 43, at 8.
56. U.S. Treas.. Reg. § 1.736-4(b)'(3) (1956).
57. Int. Re- Cojle of 1954, § .761 (c) : "P~irtnership Agreement-For purposes
of this subchapter, a partnership agreement-includes any modifications of the
partnership agreement made prior to, or at, the time prescribed by law for the
filing of the partnership return for the taxable year (not including extensions)
which are agreed to by all the partners, or which are adopted in such other
manner as may be provided by the partnership agreement."
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The agreement can be drafted with a provision that a retiring part-
ner be paid X dollars for his interest in the firm's good will. However,
when a partner indicates his desire to retire from the partnership, the
partners can "sharpen their pencils" and make some computations. If
the good will provision is applicable, the retiring partner will receive
the X dollars as capital gain, but the partnership will not be able to
deduct the payment. Thus, it may prove beneficial to amend the agree-
ment by removing the reference to good will, pay the retiring partner
an amount in excess of X dollars, but, thereby, entitle the partnership
to a deduction for the payment. The excess amount paid the retiring
partner may offset the difference between ordinary income and capital
gain rates to him, and the remaining partners may save taxes by pay-
ing "X plus" dollars that are deductible rather than by paying X
dollars that are not deductible.
Although a sale by a partner of a fifty per cent or more interest in
the capital and profits of a partnership within a twelve-month period
will terminate the partnership,,8 a retirement of such an interest will
not terminate the partnership.59 The retiring partner is deemed to con-
tinue as a partner and the partnership's taxable year does not close
with respect to him until his entire interest is liquidated.o This is true
even in a two-man partnership.1 Thus, it is relatively easy to avoid
the "bunching" problem by providing that some material payments be
made in each of two calendar years.
Retirement of Partner's Interest by Reason of Death
Just as a partner desiring to withdraw from the partnership may
sell his interest in the partnership to the remaining partners as in-
dividuals, or may have his interest retired by the partnership as an
entity, as the case may be, so may the payment for a deceased partner's
interest be cast as a sale to the individual surviving partners, or as a
retirement of the interest by the firm. Basically, the tax consequences
surrounding the disposition of a deceased partner's interest will be
the same as those inolved in a sale or retirement of a withdrawing
partner's interest, previously considered, depending upon the method
chosen and the language of the agreement. The withdrawal of a part-
ner can be timed, but no one can predict the date of death of a partner.
Because of the frequent occasions of an untimely death, special pro-
visions are desired by partners to protect their families.
A common provision is that the deceased partner's estate shall be
entitled to receive a share of the firm's profits for a reasonable time
58. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 708 (b) (1) (B).
59. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b) (1) (ii) (1956).
60. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a) (6) (1956).
61. Ibid.
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subsequent to his death. This is particularly true in service partner-
ships where the value of tangible assets is relatively little. Payments
made under such a mutual insurance provision are taxed to the re-
cipient as ordinary income if the payments are made in liquidation of
the decedent's interest in the partnership.- However, if the decedents
estate, or successor in interest, continues as a partner in its own right,
section 736 does not apply."
Section 753 provides that the amount includible in the gross income
of a successor in interest of a deceased partner under section 736 (a)
shall be considered income in respect of a decedent under section 691.
The value of a decedent's interest in the partnership at the time of
death (or one year later if alternative valuation date is used)r" will be
the basis of the interest to decedent's estate. 5 However, section
1014 (c) specifically excludes the applicability of section 1014 to items
of income in respect of a decedent under section 691. Thus, the estate'S
basis for the interest of a deceased partner does not include the value
of section 736(a) payments. A problem arises, however, of whether
the commuted value of these payments is subject to inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate.
The Bull case" held that the present value of the right of the estate
of a deceased partner to receive section 736(a) payments was not in-
cludible in the decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes. How-
ever, in the McClennan case 7 the first circuit court of appeals ruled
that such a right is includible in the gross estate of the decedent
Congress, by enacting section 753, apparently intended to adopt the
McClennan rule, rather than that of the Bull case. The senate finance
committee report states, inter alia:
Section 753 thus covers payments in the nature of mutual in-
surance as well as payments attributable to the decedent's interest
in the unrealized receivables of the partnership. Thus, while a suc-
cessor in interest of a decedent partner will be required to include
in gross income amounts received from the partnership which are
attributable to the value of the decedent's interest in unrealized
fees or mutual insurance, the recipient will at the same time re-
ceire a deduction for the estate tax paid with respect to the inclu-
sion of much rights to income in the deccdent's estate. (Emphasis
added.)"
62. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 736(a) (1).
63. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1 (a) (1) (i) (1956).
64. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2039.
65. Id. § 1014(a).
66. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
67. 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
68. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405-06 (1954).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/4
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
A recent decision by the second circuit court of appeals- 9 followed
the McClennan rule and distinguished the Bull case on the ground that
the decedent's estate' in the Bull case continued as a partner, whereas
in the McClennan situation the section 736(a) payments were made
in liquidation of the decedent's interest A more important aspect of
the Riegelman decision, however, is the opinion by the court that the
Bull case no longer states the applicable law. This conclusion is prem-
ised on the fact that subsequent to the Bull decision, Congress adopted
the concept of "income in respect of a decedent.""7 Section 691 of the
1954 Code is the present successor to section 134 (e) of the 1942 act.
The harsh result of including the present value of 736 (a) payments in
the decedent's gross estate and again including the payments, when
received, in the gross income of the estate is softened by allowing as
a deduction from the estate's gross income the amount attributable
to the estate tax paid by virtue of the inclusion of the value of the
section 736 (a) payments in the gross estate.
Although the taxable year of a partnership closes with respect to a
partner whose interest is liquidated, such is not the case when a
partner dies prior to the end of the partnership's taxable year. " This
provision avoids an automatic bunching of income in the decedent's
final return. However, if the decedent's estate, or other successor in
interest, sells the entire interest, or if the entire interest is liquidated,
the -partnership's taxable year with respect to the estate, or other
successor in interest, shall close on the date of the sale, or the date of
the completion of the liquidation.7 3 If under the terms of an agree-
ment existing at the date of death of a partner, a sale of the deceased
partner's interest in the partnership occurs upon that date, the tax-
able year of the partnership with respect to such deceased partner
shall close upon the date of death.7 4 Thus, the partners can prevent
a bunching of income upon the death of one of their number by avoid-
ing a provision that requires a sale of the interest of a deceased mem-
ber as of the date of death.
One of the most perplexing problems in a buy-and-sell agreement
is that of valuation of an interest in the partnership. In the situation
of a sale or retirement by a living partner, it is usually a matter of
contract between the parties. However, in the event of a partner's
death, the commissioner becomes a party to the agreement because
69. Estate of Riegehman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958), affirm-
ing 27 T.C. 833 (1957).
70. Int. Rev. Code of 1942, § 134(e), 56 Stat. 831 (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 691).
71. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(c).
72. Id. § 706 (c) (2) (A) (ii).
73. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c) (3) (i) (1956).
74. Id. § 1.706-1(c) (3) (iv) (1956).
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the value of the decedent's interest must be included in his gross
estate for estate tax purposes.75
The regulations-- provide that the fair market value of any interest
of a decedent in a partnership is the net amount which a willing pur-
chaser, whether an individual or a corporation, would pay for the in-
terest to a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
However, if a binding buy-and-sell agreement exists, bpth the buyer
and the seller are compelled to act, and the theory of the "free market
place" has no application. The cases hold that the commissioner will
be bound by the valuation fixed in the agreement if it was arrived at
in an arm's length transaction. 77
A unique problem confronts the draftsman of a partnership buy-
and-sell agreement in his treatment of good will. If the parties de-
sire that payment made to the estate, or successor in interest, of a
deceased partner for his share in the firm's good will is to be a 736(a)
payment, the agreement can either specifically state that good will is
given no value or can ignore the mention of good will.- If the first
method is used, the agreement will not actually embody the intent of
the parties. If the second method is elected (ignore the mention of
good will), the regulations-' hang like Damocles' sword. A suggested
solution is to place a value on the fn-m's good will, but to provide that
the payment for the decedent's interest therein is to be made from
the future earnings of the partnership. Thus, the decedents estate
receives his share of the value of the good will, and the remaining
partners receive the benefits of 736 (a) payments.
Every contract is entered into with the expectation that all parties
will abide by its provisions and perform according to its terms. If
the selling or retiring partner is alive at the time of his withdrawal
from the firm, he knows whether the buyer, or the partnership, is
financially able to perform. However, no one can foresee the financial
condition of the partnership at the time of a sudden and unexpected
death of a partner. For this reason, the funding of partnership agree-
75. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2031 (a).
76. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (a) (1958).
77. Mandel v. Sturr, 57-1 U.S.T.C. § 11688, 52 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1585
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Estate of Weil, 22 T.C. 612 (1954); Estate of Maddock, 16 T.C.
324 (1951); Estate of Blodget, 18 B.T.A. 1050 (1930).
78. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 736(b) (2) (B).
79. "Special attention should be given to determining an adequate value of
the good will of the business in all cases in which the decedent has not agreed,
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, that his
interest passes at his death to, for example, his surviving partner or partners."
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1958).
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ments with life insurance on the lives of the partners has gained con-
siderable popularity.
Basically, there are two approaches to the situation: (a) the entity,
and (b) the cross-purchase. Under the entity approach, the partner-
ship owns the insurance and is the beneficiary. When a partner dies,
the firm receives the death proceeds and uses the funds to retire the
decedent's interest. The entity approach is simple, but the proposed
regulationso raised a serious problem that caused considerable con-
cern. There was language to the effect that if the buy-and-sell agree-
ment was not supported by a full and adequate consideration, the
decedent's gross estate would have to include not merely the value of
his interest immediately prior to death, but the value as increased by
the insurance proceeds payable on his own death. However, the regu-
lations, as adopted, omitted this provision. It is the opinion of the
writer that the decision of the Tax Court in Estate of Tompkins81
properly states the law.
In that case the partnership agreement provided that the decedent's
estate was bound to transfer to his surviving partner all of his interest
in the partnership assets in exchange for the proceeds of certain life
insurance policies which the partnership carried on his life. The
court held that all of the insurance proceeds should be included in the
decedent's gross estate, but the decedent's share of the partnership
assets relinquished therefor need not be included. At the time of the
decedent's death, his interest in the partnership assets was limited
under the agreement to the amount of the insurance proceeds. In order
to ensure the favorable result of the Tompkins case, the partnership
agreement should provide that the value of a deceased partner's in-
terest shall not include any part or share of the death proceeds re-
ceived by the partnership under the life insurance policies.
Under the entity theory, each partner pays his pro-rata share of
all premiums. At first blush this seems to be an equitable arrange-
ment, but actually it may prove to be very unfair. The partner with
the largest interest in the firm will have to pay the largest premium
in order to ensure his co-partners that they will have the funds with
which to "buy him out." This simple example may illustrate the
point:
A, forty years old, owns sixty per cent of the business; B thirty-
five years old, owns forty per cent of the business; A is paying
sixty per cent of the premiums, but would need to acquire only
forty per cent of the business if B died. B, however, pays only
80. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7886 (1956).
81. 13 T.C. 1054 (1949). See also Estate of Ealy, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 431
(1951), P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. 51137; Estate of Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938);
M. W. Dobrzensky, 34 B.T.A. 305 (1936).
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forty per cent of the premiums and, yet, will have the funds to
acquire sixty per cent of the business.
As a matter of business "protection," the partners frequently desire a
provision to the effect that even if the amounts to which their estates
are entitled when they die are less than the death proceeds of the
insurance policies, their estates shall still receive the full amounts of
the proceeds. Such excess, under the entity theory, will be taxed to
the estate as a 736 (a) payment and will also be includible in the de-
cedent's gross estate.
Under the cross-purchase approach, each partner owns a policy of
life insurance on each of his co-partners. Thus, the death proceeds
are payable directly to the surviving partners. This is a more com-
plicated method than the entity approach. Upon the death of a part-
ner, his estate would transfer the policies owned by him on the lives
of his co-partners to those co-partners82 Under the 1939 Code, 3 if a
person acquired a life insurance policy on another's life for a valuable
consideration, the excess of the death proceeds received over the cost
was taxable as ordinary income. However, section 101 (a) (2) (B) of
the 1954 Code exempts such excess from taxation if the purchase was
from another partner, or from the partnership.
If the cross-purchase approach is adopted, then the payment by the
surviving partners to the decedent's estate in exchange for his interest
in the partnership will constitute a sale of the interest, and the pro-
visions of section 741 rather than section 736 will apply. As previously
discussed, this result will be favorable to the estate, but unfavorable
to the surviving partners. In the cross-purchase situation, however,
it is clear that the value of the decedent's interest in the partnership
does not include any part of the death proceeds received on his death
by the surviving partners.-
Possibly, a solution which offers the advantages of both the entity
and cross-purchase methods is to have the partnership obligate itself
to retire the interest of a deceased partner, but have the insurance
policies owned by the individual partners. Upon the death of a part-
ner, the survivors would collect the proceeds (which are non-taxable) "
and would contribute the proceeds to the partnership. Thus the part-
nership would have the funds with which to fulfill its obligation; and,
in addition, the surviving partners would increase the bases for their
82. The terminable reserve value (roughly, the cash surrender value) of the
policies owned by the decedent on the lives of the surviving partners is includible
in the decedent's gross estate. Estate of DuPont v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (2), 53 Stat. 9.
84. Rev. Rul. 56-397, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 599.
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101 (a) (1).
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interests in the partnership by the amount of the contributions."
This situation is distinguishable from the Legallet caseS7 where the
deceased partner's wife was the named beneficiary of the insurance
policy on his life and the death proceeds were paid directly to her.
A consideration of the problems discussed herein, and the ramifica-
tions of these problems in particular situations, shows the obvious
need of a partnership buy-and-sell agreement, particularly regarding
the procedure to be followed in the event of a partner's death. It is
believed that a logical close to this article is a sample provision for
the retirement of a deceased partner's interest:
"A. Upon the death of a partner, the partnership shall be continued
by the remaining partners without interruption. The estate of the
deceased partner shall be entitled to receive the value of such de-
ceased partner's interest pursuant to Paragraph B hereof, and no
other amount. [If it is desired that deceased partner's estate share
in future earnings fof a limited period, such provision can be here in-
serted.] Such amount shall be paid by the partnership to such de-
ceased partner's estate within months following the month
of his death. [If bunching may be a problem, spread out payments.]
That part of the value as is determined pursuant to subparagraph 2
of Paragraph B, to the extent it exceeds the excess of the value of
partnership property over the book value thereof, is deemed the value
of the good will of the partnership. For income tax purposes it is the
intention of the parties that the payments for the interest in good will
of a deceased partner shall be treated as a part of the payment for such
partner's interest in partnership property pursuant to section 736(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
[In the event the parties desire to treat payments for good will as
736(a) payments, the agreement can provide that the amount deter-
mined pursuant to subparagraph 2 of paragraph B be paid in guaran-
teed installments, and that the parties intend such payment to be
736 (a) payments.]
"B. (1) The value of the interest in the partnership property of a
deceased partner shall be the sum of the following:
(a) The credit balance in his Capital Account;
(b) His proportionate share of accrued net income of the part-
nership to the date of his death, unless included in his prawing Ac-
count;
(c) Any debt owed to him by the partnership, less any debt
owed by him to the partnership, and
(d) One-third (1/3) [if a three-man partnership; one-fourth
if four-man, etc.] of the amount specified in subparagraph (2).
86. Id. § 722.
87. Paul Legallet, 41 B.T.A. 294 (1940).
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(2) (a) The partners hereby determine the amount of $-......
as representing the excess of the total value of the partnership prop-
erty over its book value. This agreed amount represents the excess of
the total fair market value of all partnership property, including good
will, over the total book value of such property.
(b) The agreed value as above stated is subject to change by
the partners upon their executing Schedule 'A' attached to the copy of
this Agreement which is on file in the partnership office. The date and
amount of each new valuation shall be indicated and shall be followed
by the signatures of all of the partners. For the purpose of this Agree-
ment, the last determination of valuation shall be binding upon the
parties hereto and upon their successors, assigns, administrators and
executors. The adjustment may be a minus amount if the partners
agree that the total book value of the partnership property exceeds its
total fair market value.
(c) In the event that no Agreement with respect to an amount
has been made by the partners, in the manner provided in subpara-
graph (2) (b) above, within two years prior to the death of a partner,
any continuing partner, or the representative of the estate of the de-
ceased partner shall have the right to demand that the last agreement
with respect to such amount shall be disregarded. In that event, there
shall be submitted to arbitration, as hereinafter provided, the determi-
nation of the excess, if any, of the total value of the business, includ-
ing good will, over its book value. The excess value thus determined
shall be employed, as provided in subparagraph 1 above, in the de-
termination of the value of the interest of the deceased partner.
[Agreement should contain a standard arbitration provision.]
"C. At the present time the partnership owns a term life insurance
policy insuring the life of each partner in the amount of $
The policies are set forth in Schedule B, attached hereto. In the event
of the death of a partner, the value of his interest as computed in
Paragraph B shall not include any part or share of the benefits re-
ceived by the partnership under the aforesaid policies of life insur-
ance.
[The following is an alternate paragraph C]:
"At the present time each of the partners owns term life insurance
policies insuring the lives of his co-partners in the face amount of
$ ------------- on each co-partner. The policies are set forth in Schedule
B attached hereto. During the lifetime of the partners and the con-
tinuance in force of this Agreement, each party hereto shall pay the
premiums on the policies owned by him, as they become due, and shall
give proof of payment to the partnership within fifteen days after the
due date of each premium. In the event a premium is not paid within
fifteen days after it is due, the partnership shall pay such premium
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/4
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and charge the payment against the Drawing Account of the partner
responsible for the payment.
In the event of the death of a partner, the surviving partners shall
receive the death proceeds under the policies owned by them on the
decedent's life and shall contribute such proceeds to the capital of the
partnership. The value of the deceased partner's interest as computed
in Paragraph B shall not include any part or share of the benefits
received by the surviving partners under the aforesaid policies of life
insurance, and shall not include any part or share of the contributions
to the partnership made by the surviving partners subsequent to his
death. The estate of the deceased partner shall sell and assign to the
surviving partners the policies of life insurance owned on their lives
by the decedent at the same price that the estate can receive if such
policies are surrendered and cancelled."
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